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The protracted period of stagflation currently
experienced by the world economy, coupled with the
impotence or short-lived successes of government
policies, have made it increasingly difficult to accept
single factor explanations such as OPEC oil prices or
particular national policies. Instead, interest is
growing in a forgotten chapter of economic theory: the
occurrence of long-40-60 year - cycles in economic
growth, the so-called Kondratiev long waves.
Although much theoretical debate is still centred
around whether their existence can be statistically
proven, historical memory is much clearer on the
matter. It was commonplace to refer to the late
nineteenth century as 'the Great Depression' until the
1930s made unequivocal claim to that title. The same
general agreement seems to fall upon the great
prosperities of the 'Victorian boom', the 'Belle
Epoque' and the promise of unrelenting growth of the
l950s and early 1960s.
The reason for such disagreement between social
assessment and statistical evidence might lie in
expecting long wave phenomena to be a form of
behaviour of the economic system, measurable in the
same terms as - say - the short business cycles.
Consequently, the sceptics insist upon the detection of
long cycles in specific economic variables and upon an
explanation which would be endogenous to the
system. The problem however lies in determining
precisely which system it should be endogenous to.
Clearly, the economic subsystem can, for many
purposes, be treated as self-contained, because of its
tremendous amount of internal feedback and self-
determination. But when it domes to explaining long
waves, given the considerable transformations they
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imply in all spheres of society, we need to step out and
take a global look at the evolution of the total system,
with its technological, social and institutional
components interacting with the economic subsystem.
In this article I present a set of hypotheses explaining
Kondratiev waves as successive and distinct 'modes of
growth' of the total system. Each mode of growth
would involve the establishment of a new set of social
and institutional arrangements designed to foster the
deployment of successive technological revolutions
or, as 1 shall call them, successive 'techno-economic
paradigms'.
The present period would thus be defined as one of
transition from a mode of growth established to
accommodate a constellation of technologies based on
low-cost oil, to another shaped to suit the
requirements of a system of technologies based on
low-cost electronics.
Long waves as successive modes of evolution
Taking this total view, depression in a long wave is a
structural crisis. It is not just a halt in economic
growth hut rather the syndrome of a serious mismatch
between the techno-economic subsystem and the
socio-institutional framework. In a long wave
downswing, we are in fact witnessing the reversal of
the positive interaction between these two spheres of
the total system.
This implies that what we would actually measure,
when detecting long wave behaviour in certain
economic variables, would be the impact upon the
economy of the increasing degree of 'match', in the
upswing, and of 'mismatch', in the downswing,
between these two spheres of the system. In other
words, depression is the emergency signal calling for
full scale reaccommodation of social behaviour and
institutions, in order to suit the requirements of a
major shift which has already taken place, to a
considerable extent, in the techno-economic sphere.
The upswing, then, can only he unleashed by
appropriate social and institutional transformations
that will re-establish structural coherence.
But why should this mismatch occur? Mainly because
the two sets of subsystems, though in permanent
interaction, have very different rates of change. While
economic activity, spurred by profit and growth
motives, can result in very rapid shifts at the micro
level, the additive effect of successive and increasingly
massive shifts will only be visible in the aggregate
when change has reached critical proportions.
Institutions, on the other hand, not only come late as
regards visibility and awareness of these changes, but
also suffer from a high degree of 'natural' inertia,
strengthened by past successes and upheld by vested
interests.
I suggest that the type of fundamental shift which
underlies these periods of 'match' and 'mismatch' are
successive techno-economic paradigms, diffusing
throughout the productive sphere about every 40-60
years. They can be seen as overall technical and
managerial revolutions transforming the 'how' and
the 'what' of profitable production, in general, and
establishing a new 'best practice frontier'. Productivity
growth under each of these paradigms follows a
logistic curve and so does its rate of diffusion across
firms, branches and countries.
The upswing in the economy is the steep part of the
paradigm curve for both productivity gains and
generalisation. It is stimulated by a whole set of social
and instïtutional arrangements, national and inter-
national, influencing the operation and evolution of
factor and other markets, and designed to suit the
requirements of that particular techno-econornic
paradigm.
As limits to growth are reached along that path, a
complex set of interactions between the technological
and economic spheres gradually brings about the
crystallisation of a new paradigm, which again
revolutionises the productive system. Yet the social
and institutional mechanisms, adapted to the now
'old' and declining paradigm, cannot cope with the
new pattern of investment and the unexpected
behaviour of most markets, as the new paradigm
diffuses. These mechanisms, therefore, become
increasingly powerless and counterproductive. Thus
depression is a process of 'creative destruction' not
only in the economic sphere but also in the social and
institutional.
A techno-economic paradigm
To avoid misunderstandings, let me make clear that I
am not referring just to 'clusters' of technological
innovations, but to a system of interrelated product
and process, technical, organisational and managerial
innovations, embodying a quantum jump in potential
productivity for all, or most, of the economy and
opening up an unusually wide range of truly new
investment and profit opportunities.
Again, when I say 'paradigm' change, I mean a radical
transformation in the prevailing engineering and
managerial 'common sense' for best productive and
most profitable practice. But how would this come
about?
The organising principle of each paradigm can be
found in the dynamics of the relative cost structure of
all possible inputs to production. In it, a particular
input (or set of inputs), which could be called the 'key
factor' of each paradigm, fulfills, for a relatively long
period, the following conditions:
clearly perceived low - and descending! relative
cost;
apparently unlimited supply (for all practical
purposes);
e) obvious potential for all-pervasiveness, and
d) a generally recognised capacity, based on a set of
related innovations, to reduce the cost and change
the quality of capital equipment, labour and
products.
I suggest this conjunction of characteristics holds
today for microelectronics, leading the way towards
the fifth upswing. It held until recently for oil, which
underlay the fourth Kondratiev upturn, together with
organic chemicals and other energy intensive
materials. Before that, for the third Kondratiev, the
role of 'key factor' was played by low-cost steel; for the
second, by low-cost coal and steam-powered trans-
portation, and, for the Industrial Revolution or first
Kondratiev upswing, one could perhaps argue that the
role of 'key factor' fell upon low cost machine-tending
and cotton-growing labour.
Yet, the new 'key factor' does not appear as an isolated
input, but rather as the core of a system of technical
and managerial innovations, some related to the
production of the key factor itself and others to its
utilisation. These innovations take place through an
intensive feedback process, spurred by the decreasing
capacity of the previous key factor to further diminish
costs or increase productivity and profits.
Thus, the corresponding techno-economic paradigm
emerges gradually, in the midst of a world dominated
by the old, until it clearly appears as the 'ideal type' of
productive organisation to take maximum advantage
of the particular 'key factor', which is becoming more
and more visible in the relative cost structure. The new
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paradigm represents a quantum jump in total factor
productivity and opens an unprecedented range of
new investment opportunities. It is for these reasons
that it brings about a radical shift in engineering and
managerial 'common sense' and that it tends to diffuse
as rapidly as conditions allow, replacing the
investment pattern of the old paradigm.
The full constellation - once crystallised - goes far
beyond technical change and brings with it a
restructuring of the whole productive system. Among
other things, it involves:
a new 'best practice' form of organisation at the
firm and at the plant level;
a new skill profile, affecting both quantity and
quality of labour, with its corresponding pattern of
income distribution;
e) a new product mix, in the sense that those products
which make intensive use of the low-cost key factor
will be the preferred choice for investment and will,
therefore, represent a growing proportion ofGNP;
new trends in both basic and incremental
innovations geared at substituting relatively high
cost elements by more intensive use of the key
factor;
a new pattern in the location of investment, as the
change in the relative cost structure transforms
comparative cost advantages;
a particular wave of infrastructural investment
destined to provide the appropriate externalities;
a tendency for the largest firms to concentrate - by
growth or diversification - in those branches
where the key factor is produced or most
intensively used, which results in having distinctly
different branches acting as the engines of growth
for each Kondratiev upswing.
To give a brief example, the fourth Kondratiev techno-
economic paradigm, now exhausted, was based on low
cost oil and energy intensive materials and was led by
giant oil, chemicals, automobile and other mass
durable goods producers. Its 'ideal type' of productive
organisation at the plant level was the continuous flow
assembly-line, to turn out massive quantities of
identical units (much of it for consumers, which was in
itself an innovation, considering that these markets
had traditionally been covered by smaller and less
productive units, except, of course, in the textile-led
first Kondratiev). The 'ideal type' of firm was the
'corporation', with a separate and very complex
managerial and administrative hierarchy, including
in-house R & D and operating in oligopolistic markets.
lt benelïtted from economies of agglomeration and
required an everexpanding highway network, together
with oil and energy distribution systems for energy
intensive production, transportation and lifestyles. lt
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demanded increasing amounts of middle range
specialisation in both blue and white collar skills.
Today, with cheap microelectronics widely available
(together with the consequent low-cost of information
handling), it is no longer 'common sense' to continue
along the - now expensive! - path of energy and
materials intensity. The 'ideal' productive organisation
brings together management and production into one
single integrated system (a process we might call
'systemation'), for turning out a flexible output of
preferably information-intensive, rapidly changing,
products and services. Growth would presumably be
led by the electronics and information sectors,
requiring massive externalities from an all-encom-
passing telecommunications infrastructure, which
would bring down to negligible the cost of access for
producers and consumers alike. The skill profile tends
to change from mainly middle range to increasingly
high and low range qualifications, and from narrow
specialisation to broader and multipurpose basic skills
for information handling. Diversity and flexibility at
all levels substitute identity and massification as
'common sense' best practice.
Long wave behaviour in growth and techno-
economic paradigm shifts
These merely illustrative examples, sketching some of
the main features of two successive techno-economic
paradigms, should help to bring to light the amount of
innovation that would be required in government and
social behaviour to adapt to such shifts in productive
practice requirements.
At the micro level, when you introduce numerical
control or computer technology in a firm previously
working with electromechanical technology, it is not
possible to reap all the productivity increase potential
without transforming the whole organisation both at
the plant and the office levels, including extensive
retraining and redefinition of the forms of interaction.
In a similar manner, when the full constellation of a
new techno-economic paradigm tends to take over the
bulk of production within a society, it will not yield its
full growth potential until the socio-institutional
framework is transformed to adapt to its requirements.
In the previous upswing, a change as profound as
massive state intervention in the economy, along
Keynesian principles, was necessary to construct a
'mode of growth' capable of unleashing the full
deployment of the oil based paradigm.
Historically, though not always and not only, these
changes have affected the specific forms of operation
and regulation of the various markets (product,
labour, capital. money) on the national and
international levels; the organisation of the banking
and credit systems; the relative proportions and
character of public and private responsibility in
production, distribution and redistribution of income,
as well as the corresponding social arrangements, the
forms of organisation of workers and major interest
groups, together with the legal framework within
which they operate; the social provision of education
and training in its quality, volume and the type of
institutions in charge of it; the conditions under which
inventions are generated, protected and traded; the
international division of production as well as the
means for regulation of trade and last, but certainly
not least, the arrangements for maintaining the
international relative power balance.
Clearly, such changes cannot, and indeed have not
occurred without social and international conflict,
and they are actually the result of a tremendous
amount of experimentation. The proposed solutions
vary quite widely and, in fact, as far as being able to
achieve high rates of growth, they can be as different as
fascism and Keynesian democracy, as was seen in the
last Kondratiev trough. The challenge, of course, is to
strive for appropriate arrangements to achieve both
economic growth and maximum social welfare. Yet
the outcome will ultimately depend on the relative
strength, lucidity and capacity to innovate of the social
forces at play.
Let us now briefly look at the four phases of the long
wave in the light of techno-economic paradigm
changes:
Recovery is the period when favourable social and
institutional conditions have been put in place to
foster the generalisation of the previously crystallised
techno-economic paradigm. Innovations multiply
within the range of applications of the paradigm,
reaching more and more products, more and more
branches and even influencing the form oforganisation
of non-productive activities. Investment, profit rates
and productivity growth are high.
Prosperity is a period of exceptionally high growth
rates resulting from the combination of the final
optimisation and maximum potential yield of the
established and, by then, thoroughly generalised
paradigm, and the first successful applications of the
future paradigm. The latter generally occur as
relatively risky trial and error efforts to avoid
diminishing returns on more 'traditional' investment.
Other efforts to counter the reduction of profit
margins of those reaching the top of the logistic curve
may include relocation in search of comparative cost
advantages, mergers, acquisitions and whatever forms
of speculation are found to be attractive in that
particular period.
Recession is the decline of the now 'old' paradigm,
aggravated by the cross-currents and counter trends
created in most markets by the consequences of the
new pattern of investment. This new pattern is created
both by the appearance of many new innovative firms
and by the efforts at diversification towards the new
areas on the part of existing firms. At this time, the
first signs of difficulty for further development of the
'new' paradigm are encountered.
Depression is the exhaustion of the 'old' paradigm
but with inertia in its corresponding social and
institutional mechanisms. The latter have become
insurmountable barriers for the fructification of the
growth potential of the new techno-economic
paradigm and must be transformed.
If the model we have briefly sketched is an acceptable
approximation to the workings of the system, its main
merit would be to provide a focusing device for
orienting social and institutional change in the
appropriate direction. It suggests that through a deep
understanding of the specific characteristics, require-
ments, potential and limitations of the constellation of
technologies which begins diffusing during a down-
swing, it is possible to extract criteria for effective
social action and policy innovation.
For the social sciences it implies the need for a truly
interdisciplinary effort. During upswings it would be
possible for each to work within a chosen subsystem
with the assumption of 'all other things being equal'.
In downswings however, when the interactions are
being redefined, the traditional questions might fail to
provide the relevant answers.
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